



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

who, in order to purge out the sins committed during a life of rapine and violence, visited St. Patrick's purgatory in the twelfth century. The account given in Wright's work is taken from an ancient English version made in the fifteenth century.

After relating the ceremonies undergone by Sir Owain, we are told that he was locked up in the cave, and, shortly after, went forth. At first he had a very little light, but this, by degrees, disappeared, and he was obliged to grope his way in utter darkness, till a sort of twilight at length appeared. He first met with fifteen men in white garments, one of whom told Owain all he should have to suffer in this pilgrimage; how he would be attacked by unclean spirits, and by what means he must defend himself. He then encountered, amidst the most fearful lightning and thunder, a troop of devils, who welcomed the knight, and pretended to rejoice that he had not, like other men on earth, waited till the end of his life, but had come beforehand, to suffer the punishment of his sins. Having successfully resisted their attack, by invoking the name of Christ, another party of fiends came up:—

"Then come devesles other mony mo,
And badde y^e kny with hem to go.
And ladde him into a fowle contreye,
Wher ever was myght and never day.
For hit was derke and wonther cold,
Yette was there never man so bolde,
Hadde he never so mony clothes on,
But he wolde be colde as ony stone.
Wynde herde he none blowe,
But fast hit frese both hye and lowe.
They broughte hym to a felde full brode,
Owere such another never he yode.*
For of y^e lengthe none ende he knewe.
Thereove algate† he most now.
As he went he herde a cry,
He wondered what it was and why.
He syg; ther men and wymmen also.
That lowde cryed for hem was wo.§
They lyen thykke on every londe;
Faste nayled both fote and honde,
With nayles glowing alle of brasse.
They ete y^e erthe so wo hem was.||
Here¶ face was nayled to y^e grownde.
Spare they cryed a lytyle stounde.**
The devesles wolde hem not spare.
To hem peyne they thoughte yare.††

This was the first field of punishment. In the original Latin legend, the knight was led successively through four such fields. In the second and third the souls suffered much the same kind of torments as in the first, with this only difference in the second, that they were fixed to the ground with their backs downward, and were persecuted by multitudes of fiery serpents and toads. In the fourth, the souls were hung up in fires by the various members which had been most sinful, and some were roasted on spits and basted with molten metals. In the next place they were turned about on a great wheel of fire:—

"Some of y^e fendes turned awayne,
And forth they ladde Sir Owayne,
Full ferre into another felde.
In such one bare he never shelde.
Hit was lenger and welte more,
Than that felde was byfore.
And as he loked him besyde
He syg ther pyttus mony and wide;
Thykke they were as they myght bene;
Onethe‡ was ther a fote hem betwene.
And all manner of metalle,
He syg there yn the pyttus walle.§§
Men and wymmen ther were also,
In y^e pyttus abyding wo.
Some were thereinne up to ye chinne,
And yet had they nogt bete||| here synne.
And some were yn to shappus;¶¶
And some were up to y^e pappus;
And some were yn to y^e kne,
They wold full fayne out be."

Owaine was pushed by the devils into one of these pits, and dreadfully scalded. He was afterwards brought into a place where souls were punished in a lake of extreme coldness. He was then dragged to the mouth of hell, and afterwards taken to paradise. Finally, he was obliged to return and spend the remainder of his days on earth.***

We have given this celebrated legend of Sir Owaine at some length, from the importance of the subject with which it is connected. It was appealed to in the middle ages as authority on all questions relative to purgatory, and, according to Wright, was, in the original Latin of Henry, spread probably over every country where the Roman faith prevailed. It was also soon translated into the modern languages of Europe. There are still extant three different early French versions—all metrical. There are also two English metrical translations under the title of *Owayne Miles*. It is certain from the mention of St. Patrick's purgatory in Cæsar's, that so early as the commencement of the thirteenth century it had be-

come famous all over Europe. "If any one doubt of purgatory," says he "let him go to Ireland, and enter the purgatory of St. Patrick, and he will no longer have any question of purgatorial torments."* The pilgrimage to this place became a common thing in the thirteenth and following centuries, and even men of rank and wealth visited Ireland for this purpose. In the patent rolls of the Tower of London, under the year 1358, we have an instance of testimonials given by the king (Edward III.) on the same day to two distinguished foreigners—one a noble Hungarian, the other a Lombard, Nicholas de Beccariis—of their having faithfully performed this pilgrimage; and still later, in 1397, we find Richard II. granted a safe conduct to visit the same place to Raymond, Viscount of Perchles, Knight of Rhodes, and Chamberlain of the King of France, with twenty men and thirty horses.† Raymond, on his return to his native country, wrote a narrative of what he had seen in the Limousin dialect, of which a Latin version was printed by O'Sullivan in his *Historia Cathoica Ibernica* (Lisbon, 1621).‡

In the fifteenth century the numerous copies of the original history by Henry of Saltrey, as well as the various translations, tended greatly to increase the celebrity of St. Patrick's purgatory. At the close of this age, however, it fell into disgrace.

"A monk of Eymstadt, in Holland, who proved either more conscientious, or less credulous than former visitors, undertook the pilgrimage to Lough Derg. When he arrived at the lake, he applied for entrance to the prior, who referred him to the bishop of the diocese, without whose license no visitors were received. The monk then repaired to the residence of the bishop, but as he was 'poor and penniless,' the servants refused to admit him into their master's presence. Having, however, with difficulty obtained an audience, he fell down before the bishop and begged permission to enter St. Patrick's purgatory. The bishop demanded a certain sum of money, which he said was due from every pilgrim who came on this errand. The monk represented his poverty, and, after much urgent solicitation, the bishop granted the necessary license. He then went to the prior, performed the usual ceremonies, and was shut up in the cavern. There he remained all night, trembling with fear, and in constant expectation of a visit from the demons; but when the prior let him out the next morning, he had had no vision of any kind, and dissatisfied with the result of his pilgrimage he hastened to Rome, where he made his complaint to Pope Alexander VI. The Pope acknowledged himself convinced of the imposture, and sent orders for the destruction of the purgatory, which were put into execution with great solemnity on St. Patrick's day, 1497."§

It was not long before the place recovered its ancient reputation. The office of St. Patrick inserted in the Roman Missals of 1522 was almost entirely devoted to the celebration of the purgatory of that saint; and although this office was rejected two years afterwards, the fame of St. Patrick's purgatory continued to increase, and the legend was generally adopted by Roman theologians. During upwards of two centuries its reputation continued to spread through France, Italy, and Spain.||

Such was the belief of purgatory prevalent in the Romish Church up to the period of the Reformation. The reader will not fail to notice how far the crude notions hinted by Augustine, and afterwards by Gregory, differed from the doctrines taught in after ages. From this obvious variation it is most evident that the dogma, as held in modern times by the Church, was completed only by slow degrees, and after centuries had passed away.

(To be continued.)

WHY THE CHURCH OF ROME DISCOUNTENANCES THE GENERAL STUDY OF THE BIBLE.

It is a fact, which needs no proof, that the Church of Rome systematically discountenances the general reading of the Holy Scriptures. Indeed, so far are the advocates of that Church from wishing to deny or extenuate this fact, that they seek to justify the prohibition as wise and salutary. That the Church of Rome is perfectly consistent in acting so, there can be no doubt; nay more, it is not difficult to show, that, if her characteristic doctrines (those doctrines, we mean, which Protestants reject as innovations on the ancient faith of the Church) be true, it is not only her sound policy, but her bounden duty, to restrain the people, as much as possible, from the use of the Bible. A brief consideration of some of these doctrines will set this seeming paradox in a clear light.

1. Let us, then, begin with the worship of the Virgin. We shall not now insist on the recent development which Mariolatry has received by the papal declaration of the Immaculate Conception as an article of faith. We shall content ourselves with the adoration heretofore paid to the Virgin in Roman Catholic countries. We find, then, upon the one hand, that the honour actually paid to her, though theoretically inferior to, is practically far greater than that bestowed on our blessed Saviour himself. We find, on the other hand, no warrant, in the pages of the New Testament, for such adoration. The notices of the Virgin are brief, scanty, and incidental.

The recorded addresses of our Lord to her are few in number, and certainly not of a kind calculated to lead his disciples to pay her anything like divine honours. In the Epistles she is never once named, even by that disciple who was specially charged with her care by his dying master.* All this cannot be accidental. We are, therefore, irresistibly forced to conclude, not only that our Lord and the New Testament writers do not recognise the Virgin Mary as an object of adoration, but that they do all in their power to prevent, by anticipation, the superstitious worship which they foresaw would naturally be paid to her. Upon this point, therefore, it is at least *politic* of the Church of Rome to restrain the people from studying the New Testament; as such study must necessarily give rise to very grave suspicions as to the soundness of the Church's practice. And if the rulers of the Church of Rome really believe that Mariolatry is in accordance with the will of God, it is their bounden duty to be cautious of putting into the hands of the people documents which seem so clearly to disown and prohibit it.

2. As a second instance, in illustration of our position, we may take the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome, as the divinely-appointed successor of St. Peter. To a person taught to believe this as a divine verity, it must cause a very violent shock to find, upon studying the New Testament, that, from beginning to end, no such personage as the Bishop of Rome is ever mentioned; that not the remotest hint is given of any peculiar privileges being attached, either actually or prospectively, to the Church of Rome; that not the slightest allusion is made to St. Peter's having visited that city; while, on the contrary, very strong inferential proof is supplied that he never was there at all; and, finally, that, even admitting he visited Rome and was Bishop of that Church, there is not a shred of proof by which his apostolic prerogatives can be shown to be the *perpetual inheritance* of his successors in that See. The policy of the Church of Rome necessarily prevents her from exposing the faith of her votaries to so great a shock as discoveries of this kind in the pages of Holy Writ must occasion. And if she believes that her dogma respecting the Pope as the successor of St. Peter and the representative of Christ upon earth is true, it is also her duty to take care that her people are not put in the way of drawing inevitable inferences from Scripture tending to the weakening or the complete overthrow of their faith in the dogma.

3. The worship of images is another case in point. The Church of Rome allows the worship of the images of the Virgin and the saints. The Bible absolutely prohibits the worship of "any graven image." This palpable contradiction is attempted to be removed by subtle scholastic distinctions between various kinds of worship. It is *politic* to inculcate on the people the danger of reading a book, which, without such refined distinctions, must be misunderstood by the vulgar, to the detriment of the Church's infallible authority. And if the Church of Rome really believes that the worship of images, which was prohibited under the Jewish dispensation, is commanded under the Christian, (notwithstanding the absence of the slightest hint to that effect in the New Testament), then it becomes the duty of her rulers to discountenance the reading of a book so infinitely likely—nay, so necessarily certain—to mislead as the Bible.

4. The same may be said of the invocation of saints, and the efficacy of their intercession. The Bible says, in language which any plain reader would consider clear and unmistakable enough, that "there is one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus" (1 Tim. ii. 5, Douay Bible), and that, "if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just" (1 John ii. 1, Douay Bible). Any plain reader, we say, would naturally infer, from these and similar passages, that there was *only one* mediator between God and men, and *only one* advocate with the Father—viz., the Lord Jesus Christ. The Church of Rome teaches that there are many mediators and many intercessors (the number of whom is increasing with the canonization of every new saint), and that our Blessed Lord sustains these characters not exclusively, but merely in a peculiar sense. The vulgar could never discover this profound distinction from the seemingly unambiguous words of Holy Writ; and, accordingly, policy dictates that they should not be permitted to read a book which common sense is incapable of comprehending. And if the invocation of saints and the efficacy of their intercession be conscientiously held by the Church of Rome, it is the duty of those charged with the spiritual interests of her members to discountenance the general reading of a volume which seems, both negatively and positively, most plainly to contradict the practice of the Church.

5. Take, once more, the case of transubstantiation. The Church of Rome teaches that there is here a stupendous—nay, to human conception, an impossible—miracle constantly performed. In this instance, she insists, contrary to her usual canon of interpretation, on the literal sense of the words of Scripture; and she triumphantly refers her people—vulgar and all—to the sacred Record itself. But, then, they must not go beyond the passages

* Went. † At all events. ‡ Saw.
† They had wo. ‡ Had so much wo. ‡ Their.
** A little while. ‡ Quickly. ‡ Scarcely.
‡ Boil. ‡ Made amends for. ‡ Loina.
*** Wright as before, chap. iii.

* Dialog. de Mirac., lib. xii., cap. xxxviii.
† Federa, vol. iii., part i., p. 174; and part iv., p. 135.
‡ Wright as before, p. 136.
§ Acta Sanctorum Martiri, vol. ii., p. 150.
|| Wright as before, p. 154.

* St. John. See John xix. 27.

selected for their inspection, because they should find our Lord elsewhere frequently employing language equally strong and explicit, and which must be understood *metaphorically*; and they should, accordingly, be exposed to the risk of suspecting that, in the case of the enchanter also, a metaphorical meaning was much more probable than the existence of a mystery which it took the Church many centuries to discover—the mystery of transubstantiation. *Policy* would here, also, dictate the propriety of refusing the people unrestrained access to such dangerous sources of information; and, assuming (which it is very hard to do) that the heads of the Church of Rome really believe this doctrine, we can have no difficulty in admitting that their *duty* requires them to withhold from the faithful what must, inevitably, lead them to question its truth.

These instances are sufficient for our purpose. The case, then, stands thus: if the characteristic doctrines and practices of the Church of Rome be true, it is at once her policy and her duty to discountenance the general circulation and reading of the Scriptures. These writings, interpreted according to the ordinary rules of criticism, and in the sense which a person of average intelligence and unprejudiced judgment would elicit from them, do not bear out—nay, often directly contradict—the doctrines and practices in question. In order that there may be anything like an agreement between the Word of God and the peculiar dogmas of Romanism, the former must be interpreted in a way which none but the initiated have any idea of, and which utterly transcends the capacities of the vulgar multitude. "*Procul, o procul este profani*," is, accordingly, the language of the privileged class to whom belongs the unfolding of the mystic pages of Scripture. The Bible, say they in effect and even in express words, is a grand enigma, which no individual Christian can venture to unravel, except at the imminent risk of making shipwreck of his faith. One renowned Romish theologian calls it a "Sibyl's prophecy;" another, "riddles of the Sphinx;" a third, "a leaden rule;" a fourth, "a nose of wax," which may be twisted backwards and forwards, and moulded into any shape; a fifth informs us that, without the sanction of the Church, Scripture could no more claim to be received than the Fables of Æsop; and a sixth asserts that it has no higher internal evidence than the Koran. If all this be true, it is not to be wondered at that the unsophisticated vulgar should be withheld from too close contact with a book so dangerous in its tendency; and the Church only fulfils a plain duty in protecting her children from the perilous consequences that must result from its free study.

But if the Bible contain a *revelation* of God, designed to make known to the world His will and purposes, so far as He condescends to make them known; if it be written by men supernaturally endowed for the express purpose of conveying the revelation free from all human error and imperfection; if these men wrote, as they manifestly did write, in a way which they conceived to be level to the capacities of the generality of Christians, without mystical subtleties, or enigmatical reserve; if all the ancient Fathers acknowledge the Scriptures to be the plain and unmistakable rule of faith and practice; and if, notwithstanding, these Scriptures cannot be made to speak the characteristic language of the modern Church of Rome, except by a system of interpretation, which, applied to any other book in the world, would be called forced, unnatural, and inconsistent with itself; then, surely, there is strong reason to suspect that motives of *policy* alone lie at the foundation of the dislike which the Church of Rome evinces to the general diffusion of the written Word of God; and it may be fairly concluded, that if she is influenced by a feeling of *duty*, it is a feeling which cannot be referred to God as its author or its object.

ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY.

No. V.

WE have some fear lest many of our readers should have had enough of St. Liguori and his crooked ways, and should be rather tired of the subject of equivocation and mental reservation. However, as what we have said did not contain a full exposure of his doctrines, we venture to devote one article more to the subject. It will be remembered that the teaching we have hitherto considered related to the ordinary intercourse of society between persons who are under no peculiar obligation to each other. In such cases we found the moral teachers of Rome holding that we are not bound to speak the truth, and that any equivocation, short of absolute falsehood, was perfectly innocent. They add, besides, that we may not only utter these equivocations, but also confirm them with an oath; for, as they very logically conclude, if it is no sin to say these things, of course it can be no sin to swear them. However, we are promised a stricter morality in the case of persons who hold a special relation to one another. As we quoted from the *Rambler*, last month, "the relation of a parent to a child, of a master to his servant, of a judge to a witness, of a physician to a voluntary patient, even say of a bankrupt's creditors to a bankrupt, is quite different to that of persons who are in a condition of perfect equality, and who are bound by no peculiar engagement to one another."

Let us, then, inquire into the particulars of some of these picked cases, and see what kind of morality is supplied when the dealers of the Church of Rome offer to furnish the article of superior quality and of the

purest description. And the first thing which strikes one as odd in this passage from the *Rambler* is the curious, doubtful way in which the case of a bankrupt is introduced—"even, say, of a bankrupt to his creditors"—as if the obligation in this case were not so great as in the one mentioned before, that of a physician and a voluntary patient. We are led to suppose that if a patient, in obtaining the advice of a physician, were to keep concealed some of his ailments, it would be a mortal sin; but that if a bankrupt were to keep concealed some of his property from his creditors, the case would not be so clear. Let us shut up the *Rambler*, and turn to the fountain-head, and see what St. Liguori tells on the subject; and, in fact, we find the saint laying down (iv. 158), that he who wants for his support goods which he has concealed, may answer the judge that he has got none. In like manner, an heir who has concealed goods, without an inventory, if he is not bound to satisfy the creditors out of them, may answer the judge that he has concealed nothing—mentally subjoining, "of the goods out of which he is bound to make satisfaction." And Liguori is not the only Roman Catholic moralist who is thus indulgent to bankrupts.

The great Blaise Pascal, in the eighth of his celebrated Provincial Letters, alludes to some of them, as follows:—

"I have now to say a little," cried the monk, "in regard to those who are in embarrassed circumstances. Our casuists have sought to relieve them according to their condition of life. For, if they have not enough of property for a decent maintenance, and at the same time for paying their debts, they permit them to secure a fortune by making a bankruptcy with their creditors.* This has been decided by Lessius, and confirmed by Escobar as follows:—'May a person who turns bankrupt, with a good conscience, keep back as much of his personal estate as may be necessary to maintain his family in a respectable way—*ne indecore vivat*? I hold, with Lessius, that he may, even though he may have acquired his wealth unjustly, and by notorious crimes—*ex injustitia et notorio delicto*; only, in this case he is not at liberty to retain so large an amount as he otherwise might.'"

"Indeed, father! (says Pascal) what a strange sort of charity is this, to allow property to remain in the hands of the man who has acquired it by rapine, to support him in his extravagance, rather than to go into the hands of his creditors, to whom it legitimately belongs!"

"It is impossible to please everybody" replied the father; "and we have made it our particular study to relieve these unfortunate people. This partiality to the poor has induced our great Vasquez, cited by Castro Palao, to say that 'if one saw a thief going to rob a poor man, it would be lawful to divert him from his purpose by pointing out to him some rich individual, whom he might rob in place of the other.' If you have not access to Vasquez or Castro Palao, you will find the same thing in your copy of Escobar; for, as you are aware, his work is little more than a compilation from twenty-four of the most celebrated of our fathers. You will find it in his treatise, entitled 'The Practice of our Society in the matter of Charity towards our Neighbours.'"

"A very singular kind of charity this," I observed, "to save one from suffering loss by inflicting it upon another! But I suppose that to complete the charity, the charitable adviser would be bound in conscience to restore to the rich man the sum which he had made him lose?"

"Not at all, sir," returned the monk; "for he did not rob the man—he only advised the other to do it. From such a mass of evidence you ought to be satisfied now of the futility of your objections; but we are losing sight of our subject. To revert, then, to the succour which our fathers apply to persons in straitened circumstances—Lessius, among others, maintains that it is lawful to steal, not only in a case of extreme necessity, but even where the necessity is *grave*, though not *extreme*."

"This is somewhat startling, father," said I. "There are very few people in this world who do not consider their cases of necessity to be *grave* ones, and to whom, accordingly, you would not give the right of stealing with a good conscience. And though you should restrict the permission to those only who are really and truly in that condition, you open the door to an infinite number of petty larcenies, which the magistrates would punish in spite of your 'grave necessity,' and which you ought to repress on a higher principle—you who are bound by your office to be the conservators, not of justice only, but of charity, between man and man—a grace which this permission would destroy. For after all, now, is it not a violation of the law of charity, and of our duty to our neighbour, to deprive a man of his property, in order to turn it to our own advantage? Such, at least, is the way I have been taught to think hitherto."

"That will not always hold true," replied the monk;

* The Jesuits exemplified their own maxim in this case by the famous bankruptcy of their College of St. Hermangilde, at Seville. We have a full account of it in the memorial presented to the King of Spain by the luckless creditors. The simple paths and sincere earnestness of this document preclude all suspicion of the accuracy of its statements. By the advice of their Father Provincial, the Jesuits, in March, 1645, stopped payment, after having borrowed upwards of 450,000 ducats, mostly from poor widows, and friendless girls. This shameful affair was exposed before the courts of justice during a long litigation, in the course of which it was discovered that the Jesuit fathers had been carrying on extensive mercantile transactions, and that, instead of spending the money left them for *pious uses*—such as ransoming captives, and alms-giving—they had devoted it to purposes of what they termed "our poor little house of profession."

"for our great Molina has taught us that 'the rule of charity does not bind us to deprive ourselves of a profit, in order thereby to save our neighbour from a corresponding loss.' He advances this in corroboration of what he has undertaken to prove—'That one is not bound in conscience to restore the goods which another had put into his hands, in order to cheat his creditors.' Lessius holds the same opinion on the same ground."*

Let us, however, come on to examine the general case of a witness in a court of justice. We find it laid down here (iv. 154) that, 'a witness, not legitimately questioned, may swear that he does not know of a crime which he really does know—mentally subjoining, that he does not know of any crime *legitimately inquired of*; or that he does not know it, *so as to give evidence of it*. The same is the case if the witness, for some other reason, is not bound to give evidence; for example, if he is himself quite assured that the act committed is without guilt, or if he knows the crime only as a secret, and no ill repute has got abroad. When, however, the witness or defendant is legitimately questioned by the judge, he must not use any equivocation, because he is then bound to obey the rightful precept of his superior. This is the common opinion, and the same must be said about an oath in onerous contracts, because otherwise injury would be done to another. Except in the case of a trial, the crime be altogether concealed, for then a witness may, *say, he is bound to say that the defendant has not committed it*; and so may the defendant, if there is not already half full proof. So says Tamburini, with the common opinion, because then the judge does not question legitimately."

It will be seen, then, that it is a very important question—When does a judge inquire legitimately? The *Christian Remembrancer* gives the following answer to this, from Garnet's "Treatise on Equivocation."† The order of law requires these five things—

"First, that the party who examineth must be a lawful superior. . . . Secondly, he must have authority over the person whom he examineth. . . . Thirdly, the matter itself must be subject to the judge. . . . Fourthly, he must proceed according to a just law, for, whereas a judge is, as Aristotle calls him, a living law, as the law itself is a dumb judge; even as the law, when it is unjust, is no law, so a judge, in the execution of an unjust law, is no judge. Finally, it is very necessary that the judge do not proceed against a man to examine him, or call him into question, but in cases which are public and manifest, or when great suspicions and presumptions, or common reports, do seem to condemn the party, or sufficient testimony convince him."

So likewise St. Liguori, Lib. v. 276:—

"It is certain that a witness is not bound to confess the truth to a judge, when he does not legitimately interrogate; for, then, he may lawfully answer, even with an oath, that he does not know the crime (aside) *so as to be bound to declare it unto him*. But, it is asked, when does a judge question legitimately? The reply is—when there is already half full proof. When there is this, the crime is no longer said to be secret; and, therefore, the judge has a right that the witness shall declare the truth. So in common, Lessius, Navarrus, and others, with the Salamanca doctors, who observe that no witness is bound to answer in this way, unless repute of the guilt, or half full evidence of it, or clear signs of it be already proved and shown to him by the judge—unless, indeed, it is quite certain that the judge is a good man, and he declares that he is legitimately questioning. . . . A judge does not legitimately question unless there has previously been notoriety, ill repute, or other half full proof."

And we are told further on that a witness commits a crime in five ways, one of which is—if he discover the truth which he ought to conceal!!!

Let us now test this doctrine of Liguori by a particular example. Many of our readers will remember the trial of Boyle v. Wiseman, which took place last year. The object of the plaintiff was to prove that Cardinal Wiseman was the writer of a certain libellous letter, which had been published with his name; and several witnesses were brought forward, to whom, it was supposed, the Cardinal had confessed his authorship of the letter. The following is a report of part of what occurred:—

"Dr. T. Grant was examined—He said, I am the Roman Catholic Bishop of St. George's, Southwark; I know the defendant, and am on intimate terms with him; I remember going to Paris on the subject of this libel; but I don't remember having had any conversation with the defendant relating to it; I had a conversation with a gentleman belonging to the *Univers* journal, but he did not give me any MS.; I am quite sure that the defendant never

* Molina t. ii., tr. 2, disp. 328, n. 8. Lessius liv. ii., ch. 20, dist. 19, n. 164. Escobar tr. 3, ex. 1, n. 23, tr. 5, ex. 4, n. 53. Pascal adds to this letter that the best editions of Escobar are the Lyons edition, having in the title-page the device of a lamb lying on a book, sealed with seven seals, and the Brussels edition of 1651. There has, however, since Pascal's time, been a new and corrected edition, printed at Paris, by Piget (see Nicole's edition of the Provincial Letters). We may here add, that not one of the charges brought against the Jesuits in this eighth letter, has been met by Father Daniel in his celebrated reply.

† The quotations from Liguori which follow are also taken from the same article in the "Christian Remembrancer," to which we have a ready expressed our obligations in this series of articles. We happen to write at a distance from the greater part of our books, and the volume of Liguori, here cited, is not at hand.